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THE EFFICACY OF NEW YORK’S QUALIFIED 
PROHIBITION ON NDAS AND REFORMS THAT 




The numerous sexual harassment scandals that were uncovered following 
the Harvey Weinstein exposé1 have at least one very positive byproduct: new 
state legislation aimed to protect and combat sexual misconduct in the 
workplace.2  New York is leading the charge by creating a legislative 
framework that protects a broader spectrum of workers against sexual 
harassment in the workplace.3  The State’s 2019 fiscal year budget 
substantiates the commitment to empower survivors and protect those who 
may be future targets of sexual harassment in their workplaces.4  As part of 
this framework, the State’s human rights laws now extend to and protect 
independent contractors, who ordinarily would have limited federal 
protections against sexual harassment because they are ineligible for Title 
VII protection.5  In another forging step, New York now prohibits employers 
from including or agreeing to include a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) in a 
settlement agreement regarding a sexual harassment claim, unless the 
employee seeks the confidentiality.6  This prohibition is a step in the right 
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harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/YQB5-C38P]. 
 2. Cara Kelly & Aaron Hegarty, #MeToo Was a Culture Shock.  But Changing Laws Will 
Take More Than a Year, USA TODAY (Oct. 5, 2018, 12:28 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/investigations/2018/10/04/metoo-me-too-sexual-assault-survivors-rights-
bill/1074976002/ [https://perma.cc/NVW3-4J2V]. 
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direction as new data shows the increasing prevalence of NDAs in the 
workplace, often silencing instrumental employee speech.7  The legislature’s 
regulation over NDAs is revolutionary in itself; however, in its current 
condition, the law has two shortcomings which limit its efficacy.  First, the 
key state resources that employees would turn to in order learn about their 
rights do not contain any information about their right to reject an NDA when 
they do not prefer it.8  Second, the way that the legislation is currently drafted 
allows employers to manipulate employees into “preferring” an NDA, 
canceling the law’s intended effect.  The law’s current mode of dissemination 
and its parameters should therefore be amended to address both the notice 
and coerced NDA issues. 
Many survivors often do not wish to file a complaint with their employer 
because they fear that they would face adverse action or worse—that the 
whole process would be futile.9  In the face of these risks, it is helpful for 
survivors to know their rights, one of which is that their employer cannot 
sweep a legitimate complaint under the rug by exchanging a settlement for 
an NDA.10  The legislative framework requires that employers establish and 
distribute to employees a sexual harassment policy, as well as a complaint 
form.11  Within their respective sexual harassment policies, employers must 
“inform employees of their rights of redress.”12  Part of those rights of redress 
would presumably be notice of the employee’s right to control the inclusion 
 
no employer, its officer or employee shall have the authority to include or agree to include in 
such resolution any term or condition that would prevent the disclosure of the underlying facts 
and circumstances to the claim or action unless the condition of confidentiality is the plaintiff’s 
preference.”); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2018). 
 7. See generally Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, An 
Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment 
Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 8. See N.Y. STATE DIV. OF HUMAN RIGHTS, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, https://dhr.ny.gov/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/sexual-harassment.pdf [https://perma.cc/6LG2-55M8] (last visited Mar. 
6, 2019) (describing the complaint process without mention of the employee’s right to reject 
a nondisclosure agreement); see also N.Y. STATE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY FOR ALL 
EMPLOYERS IN NEW YORK STATE, https://www.ny.gov/sites/ny.gov/files/atoms/files/ 
SexualHarassmentPreventionModelPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK9P-VZHY] (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2019).  This policy lacks reference to the NDA law or any information about an 
employer’s inability to insert NDAs on their own. See id. 
 9. See L. Camille Hebert, Why Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual 
Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 711, 724–25 (2007); see also Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of 
Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 51–52 (2003). 
 10. See Mori Irvine, Mediation: Is It Appropriate for Sexual Harassment Grievances?, 9 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 51 (1993) (“Victims of sexual harassment must know that 
their harassers will be punished and that they will not be prodded to minimize their 
abuse . . . .”).  Having notice of one’s rights in a settlement agreement with her employer gives 
her the knowledge that she can create real pressure on her employer to implement internal 
reforms. 
 11. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-g (McKinney 2018).  The employers’ policies must meet a 
number of basic requirements, as illustrated in the State’s model policy. See N.Y. STATE, 
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT PREVENTION POLICIES, 
https://www.ny.gov/sites/ny.gov/files/atoms/files/MinimumStandardsforSexualHarassmentP
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 12. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-g(1)(A) (McKinney 2018). 
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of an NDA in the settlement agreement.  However, neither the Department 
of Labor’s “model policy” for employers nor what the State terms its 
“Employee Toolkit” explaining the new legislation contain any reference to 
the NDA law.13  These omissions leave open the very real possibility that 
employers will not include any mention of the nondisclosure legislation in 
their own policies.  Employees generally are unaware of the protections and 
exemptions to NDAs that they sign with their employer.14  Without readily 
available notice to this legislation, survivors who already believe that filing 
a complaint in their workplace to be futile will continue to believe so.  One 
reform which can be implemented quickly and at little cost is to include this 
information in the State’s model policy.  The state legislature should further 
require that the employer’s policy be posted in the workplace rather than 
merely available in some written or electronic form.15  Giving employees 
ready and clear access to all of their legal rights related to sexual harassment 
in the workplace will be helpful for them to ultimately make the decision to 
file a complaint. 
A second drawback to the current legal regime is that it allows for 
employer manipulation, which could effectively wash away the NDA law’s 
entire impact.  While some survivors truly desire an NDA for their own 
privacy, opting out of an NDA can still benefit them and play a real role in 
alleviating the pattern of sexual harassment in their workplace.16  The law’s 
plain language requires that the employee must prefer confidentiality in order 
for a settlement agreement between her and the employer to contain an 
NDA.17  In other words, the employer cannot include an NDA in the 
settlement without establishing that it was the employee’s preference.  
However, there is no prohibition against the employer using its inherently 
greater bargaining power to pressure the employee to include an NDA.  For 
instance, an employer can leverage a greater settlement amount in exchange 
 
 13. See N.Y. STATE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY FOR ALL EMPLOYERS IN NEW YORK 
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 14. See Orly Lobel, NDAs Are out of Control.  Here’s What Needs to Change, HARV. BUS. 
REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-heres-what-needs-to-
change [https://perma.cc/W54V-2FXA]. 
 15. See Combating Sexual Harassment: Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. STATE, 
https://www.ny.gov/combating-sexual-harassment-workplace/combating-sexual-harassment-
frequently-asked-questions#for-workers [https://perma.cc/R9TW-BGKF] (last visited Mar. 2, 
2019) (explaining the requirements for employers’ mandated sexual harassment policies, 
which fail to impose a requirement that employers physically and publicly post their sexual 
harassment policy). 
 16. See Annie Hill, Nondisclosure Agreements: Sexual Harassment and the Contract of 
Silence, GENDER POL’Y REP. (Nov. 14, 2017), https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/ 
nondisclosure-agreements-sexual-harassment-and-the-contract-of-silence/ 
[https://perma.cc/F53K-NZ3M] (discussing the difficulty of identifying alleged sexual 
harassers when claims against them were settled with an NDA, and emphasizing the increased 
difficulty of identification once they moved on to different employers). 
 17. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-336 (McKinney 2018). 
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for the employee’s “preference” for an NDA.18  In an even more extreme 
case, an employer can refuse to settle with an employee or implicitly threaten 
to instead litigate the sexual harassment claim of an employee who has fewer 
resources or lacks an attorney.19  The high cost of litigation weighed against 
a settlement that includes an NDA would be preferable to less sophisticated 
workers, who either cannot afford legal counsel or are afraid to seek legal 
advice.20  To give this legislation its intended impact, the law must be 
amended to bar such employer manipulation.  One possible amendment 
would be to include a clause that requires employers to make settlement 
offers in good faith, without putting any direct or indirect pressure on the 
employee to include an NDA.  This amendment would provide a right of 
action for the employee if the employer were to act in bad faith prior to or 
during the settlement negotiations.  Moreover, it would incentivize 
employers to self-police their interactions with employees who bring 
harassment claims. 
A seemingly attractive amendment would entirely remove the condition of 
the plaintiff’s preference.  Such an amendment would place a full bar on 
NDAs and, in theory, remove the employer’s opportunity to leverage its 
power against the employee.  However, such an amendment would be 
misguided because employers could then threaten to publicly disclose details 
about the complaining employee in exchange for more favorable settlement 
terms.  Having to publicly relive their trauma would compel many 
complainants to submit to a less favorable settlement in exchange for 
safeguarding their own privacy.21  Thus, such an amendment would pose the 
same coercion issue that the current law presents.  Instead, an alternate 
amendment that still allows employee-preferred NDAs—but with a narrower 
state-defined scope—would strike a better balance.  The NDA’s 
legislatively-defined scope could omit the employee’s name and some details 
harmful to the employer, such as the settlement amount agreed upon.  The 
NDA’s narrower scope, however, should not mean that wrongdoers’ names 
and actions are off-limits, but rather that the employer’s entire reputation 
does not dissolve with the details of one of its employee’s actions.  
Regardless of the exact amendment that the state sets for NDA legislation, it 
must acknowledge and react to the law’s current insufficiency and potential 
effectiveness. 
 
 18. Lobel, supra note 14. 
 19. See Hill, supra note 16. 
 20. While the legislation does establish a unit within the Joint Commission on Public 
Ethics to address sexual harassment claims, the unit would not be able to provide legal advice 
to employees in the private sector. See Jurisdiction and Authority, N.Y. STATE JOINT 
COMMISSION ON PUB. ETHICS, https://jcope.ny.gov/jurisdiction-and-authority 
[https://perma.cc/A98Y-PAHK] (last visited Mar. 6, 2019) (“The Commission regularly 
provides advice and guidance to State officers and employees and lobbyists and clients 
concerning ethics and lobbying laws.”) (emphasis added); see also FY 2019 EXECUTIVE 
BUDGET, supra note 4, at 119 (establishing new unit within the Joint Commission on Public 
Ethics). 
 21. See Hill, supra note 16. 
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New York State is pioneering important legislative reforms that combat 
sexual harassment in the workplace.  However, the State should not overlook 
shortcomings in its current laws.  To do so would weigh swiftness over 
substance, leaving many employees just as unprotected as they were before 
the reforms. 
 
